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HARVARD

LAW REVIEW.
VOL. XXVI.

MAY, 1913.

NO. 7.

CONDITIONAL DELIVERIES OF DEEDS OF LAND.
NORMALLY the final act of the grantor in the making of a
of land is its delivery to the grantee. It is not necessary
for the purposes of this article to enter into any exhaustive analysis
of the essentials of a good delivery; to consider whether delivery
is purely a question of the grantor's intent or whether that intent
must be evidenced by some external physical act, or the further
question whether in addition to this intent there must be a physical tradition or other dealing with the instrument. Assuming a
sufficient external manifestation of intent and a sufficient physical
delivery of the instrument, the question whether this otherwise complete instrument becomes operative as a deed may be said to be
a question of the grantor's intent. If he intends that this otherwise
complete instrument shall now become operative as his deed, it
does now so become; if he does not so intend, then, in the absence
of facts that will raise an estoppel against the grantor it will not
be treated as his deed. Consequently if A. signs and seals a conveyance of land in favor of B., but keeps it in his desk with nothing
more than the idea that he may at some future date deliver it,
there is dearly no deed. The situation is unchanged if he puts it
in the hands of a third person to keep for him. On the other hand,
if A. takes this otherwise complete instrument executed in favor of
B. and hands it over as his deed to B., who accepts it as such, it
needs no citations to establish that the title to the land thereupon
Sdeed
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passes from A. to B. The same consequence follows if A., intending
thereby to make the instrument operative as his deed, delivers it as
such to X. as the agent of B., and this is equally true whether X.
is the duly authorized agent of B. or whether he is in fact a stranger
to B., provided that the latter subsequently ratifies his act. Whether
in general a separate act of acceptance by B. is necessary to make
the instrument operate as a deed need not be discussed.
For the purposes of this article the important feature in the illustrations given is the fact that, whether the transaction is immediate between A. and B., or whether a third person X. is involved,
the transfer of title is (save for the question of acceptance above
alluded to) instantaneous. If X. is merely A.'s agent and A. has
not yet manifested his intent that the instrument should operate
as his deed, it is a nullity, and B., whatever his equitable rights
may be, has no legal interest in the property. If X. is acting as
B.'s agent, authorized or unauthorized, and A. has made a
delivery to him as such, the title is wholly in B. and A. has no
legal interest in the property save as it may be reserved to him
upon the face of the instrument.
Between these two extremes lies a group of cases where, without making any attempt to state the situation with technical exactness, it may be said that the transfer from A. to B. of the title,
using this term to denote the sum total of the" real rights that are
the subject matter of the deed, is not instantaneous. This situation
arises when the third person X., to whom the deed is handed over,
is the agent of both A. and B.; where the deed has passed out of
the control of A. but where its coming into the complete control
of B. is dependent upon a contingency of some kind. This is the
class of case that is loosely referred to as an escrow, or conditional delivery.
Looking at the cases somewhat more carefully, it will be seen
that there are three fundamentally different situations which are
embraced within the more general phrases above-mentioned. (i) B.
may have a contractual right against A. with respect to the land,
and the conveyance may be executed by A. and left with X. to be
by him delivered to B. upon the performance by the latter of his
part of the contract. This is the situation to which the term
"escrow" is most fittingly and commonly applied. (2) A. may execute a conveyance in favor of B. and give it to X. to be by him
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delivered to B. upon A.'s death. (3) A. may execute a conveyance
in favor of B. and give it to X. to be by him delivered to B. upon the
happening of some contingency other than those above mentioned.
Each of these groups will be separately considered.
I.
Suppose that A. and B. make a contract to sell and buy respectively a piece of land, and that A. further agrees to and does in fact
execute in proper form and give to X. a deed of the land. X., it is
agreed, is to hold it until B. performs his part of the contract and is
then to deliver it to B. B. performs his part of the contract, which
we may assume to be the payment of the purchase price, and X.
delivers to him the deed. B. gets a good title. When did the instrument become A.'s deed so as to pass the legal title to B.? Obviously not when A. handed it over to X., for he did not intend that
it should at that time become his deed. His intent was, and it was
sufficiently externally manifested by the terms under which he delivered the instrument to X., that it should become his deed when
the consideration was paid by B. There seems to be no difference
of opinion on the proposition that both inter partes and as regards
third persons who stand in no peculiar relations to either A. or B.
the escrow becomes a deed and the title passes at the second delivery.' Thus when at the time of the first delivery there was an outstanding interest in the land which is bought in by the grantor
before the second delivery there is no breach of the covenants of
title; 2 so as to an incumbrance removed between the two deliveries
by the grantee, the fact that it was in existence when A. delivered
to X. is no breach of the covenant against incumbrances; 3 so the
fact that A. has delivered the escrow to X. for B. cannot be set up
4
by A.'s tenant in bar of a distraint for rent by A.
Suppose, however, that after the delivery from A. to X. but before B. performs, A. directs X. not to deliver the instrument to B.
on B.'s performance. What are now B.'s rights? It has been held
I Hull v. Sangamon River Drainage District,

219

Ill. 454, 76 N. E. 701 (igo6);

Andrews v. Farnham, 29 Minn. 246, 13 N. W. 16i (1882).
American Emigrant Co., 93 U. S. 124 (1876).
2 Furness v. Williams, II Ill. 229 (1849).
2 Hoyt v. McLagan, 87 Ia. 746, 55 N. W. 18 (1893).
4 Oliver v. Mowat, 34 U. C. Q. B. 472 (1874).

See County of Calhoun v.
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that he may if he wishes, after performance or tender, ignore the
delivery in escrow, and go into equity and compel A. to execute a
new deed.' He need not, however, so do. If X., after performance
by B., delivers the deed to B. despite A.'s order to the contrary,
it is well settled that this will be sufficient to vest the legal title in
B. 6 If X. does not deliver the deed after performance by B., the
title is nevertheless held to pass,7 and B. may maintain a bill in
equity against X. to compel him to deliver the deed,8 or if the deed
has wrongfully been delivered by X. to a third person, B. may maintain trover for it against such third person. 9 There is no hardship
on A. in this rule and it is an easy way of accomplishing justice, but
for an understanding of other aspects of the law of escrow it is well
to see exactly what is done in this case. As has been already pointed
out, the general rule is clear that the delivery of a deed is fundamentally a question of the grantor's intent. If he executes and delivers
the deed in pursuance of a decree of a court of equity his intent is
immaterial, because the only court to which he c6uld go to get relief
against this deed is the one that has ordered him to make it. But
in the present case the instrument has been voluntarily executed,
and although he may be guilty of a breach of contract in not consenting, at the time when the grantee performs, that it shall become operative as his deed, the fact still remains that he does not
so consent. Upon what principle then can the court nevertheless
declare it to be effective as his deed? Let us for a moment consider
a different kind of case.
Suppose, independently of any question of escrow, that A. contracts with B. to sell and B. to buy a piece of land. B. pays or
tenders the price; A. refuses to convey. B. can go into equity and
obtain a decree compelling A. to execute a deed in due form. As
has just been mentioned, the fact that A. at the moment when he
was delivering the deed in pursuance of the decree was in a state
of internal rebellion and in fact did not intend the instrument as his
5 Gammon v. Bunnell, 22 Utah 421, 64 Pac. 958 (igoo).
6 Wymark's Case, s Coke 74 a (1594); Bradbury v. Davenport, 120 Cal. 152, 52
Pac. 301 (i898); Hughes v. Thistlewood, 40 Kan. 232, 16 Pac. 629 (x888); Regan v.
Howe, 121 Mass. 424 (1877); Farley v. Palmer, 20 Oh. St. 223 (1870).
7 See cases cited in preceding note.
8 Tombler v. Sumpter, 97 Ark. 480, 134 S. W. 967 (1911); Guild v. Althouse, 71
Kan. 604, 81 Pac. 172 (19o5)'; 'Knopf v. Hansen, 37 Minn. 215, 33 N. W. 781 (z887).
0 Hooper v. Ramsbottom, 6 Taunt. 12 (1815).
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deed would make no difference. It would have all the earmarks of
a deed, and B.'s title acquired under the deed would be unimpeachable.'0 Now consider the situation when there is in fact this
escrow which A. has agreed shall become his deed upon the payment
by B. of the purchase price. B. has paid, but A. has refused his
consent that it shall become his deed. Here already at hand is a
document which bears all the earmarks of A.'s deed; B.'s equitable
right is clear to compel performance by A. of his part of the contract, but such a deed when executed by A. will, so far as outward
appearance goes, be no more A.'s deed than the one now in existence. Under such a state of facts it is not to be wondered at that a
court should simply make a short cut, ignore the non-existence of
A.'s intent and declare the present document to be binding at law
as his deed. The court may say that A.'s intent in this kind of
case is immaterial, or it may put the doctrine in the form of a fiction and say that his intent is "irrevocably given" or is "conclusively presumed to continue." The important fact is, that in a
case where there would be relief in equity the courts have seized
on the existence of the escrow to work out the same relief under a
legal formula."
When the rights of third persons are involved, the fictional character of the doctrine of delivery in escrow and the fact that it is
essentially a working out of equitable rights under legal formua
are more clearly perceptible. Thus, suppose that after A. and B.
have contracted as before, A., after depositing the escrow with X.
but before B. performs, dies, leaving an heir, C. Now not only is it
clear that when B. performs A. cannot intend the instrument to
operate as his deed, but there is the further difficulty that at that
time the legal title to the land is not in A. but in C. Plainly B.
could go into equity here and get a conveyance from C. since the
10Compare "Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defences," by James Barr Ames,
9 HARv. L. REV. 49, at 57, 58.
u In Jackson v. Catlin, 2 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 248 (1807), Chancellor Kent discussed
at some length the character of the right of a grantee in an escrow and came to the
conclusion that it was in the nature of a condition, personal to the grantee, and did
not pass to the state under an act of attainder that forfeited "all his estate, both real
and personal, held or claimed by him, whether in possession, reversion, or remainder,
and also all estates and interests claimed by executory devise or contingent remainder." It is worth noting that the statute does not in terms include equitable
interests.
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latter is not a bona'fide purchaser. Can the court of law use the
instrument previously executed and still in X.'s possession to accomplish the same result? Surely. All that is necessary is for the
court to say that on the performance by B. and the delivery by
X. the deed of A. "relates" to the time of the original delivery by A.
to X. Thus B. is saved the need of a recourse to equity. Such a
statement, of course, is another fiction - the language used really
explains nothing. If, however, the suggestion already made be
borne in mind and if the law as laid down be regarded as being, as in
the situation previously considered, a working out in legal forms of
equitable rights, the case becomes readily understandable. There
are a number of decisions that hold under just these facts that as a
matter of law A.'s deed operates to convey to B. a title that is good
as against A.'s heir, A. having died after the delivery to X. but
before the performance by B.12
This fiction of relation is a hard tool to handle: under what circumstances will the second delivery relate to the first so as to cut
out intervening rights? It must be admitted that the rules ordinarily laid down are of no great assistance in a specific case, whether
we take the statement of Sheppard's Touchstone 11 "that to some
purposes it hath relation to the time of the first delivery and to
some purposes not," or the language that the courts at present not
infrequently use, that the deed will relate where it is necessary "to
accomplish justice." If the principle that has already been suggested, namely, that the courts in their determination of the rights
created under a delivery in escrow have been unconsciously working
out in legal form by means of fictions what are essentially equitable
rights, is capable of general application it ought not to be difficult
to arrive at a perfectly specific answer to the question as to when the
legal title derived under an escrow relates to the first delivery. If
C., the person whose rights intervene between the first and the second delivery, is a purchaser for value from A. without notice of
B.'s rights, then there will be no relation; the second delivery will
12 Davis v. Clark, 58 Kan. 100, 48 Pac. 563 (1897); Guild v. Althouse, 71 Kan.
6o4. 8i Pac. 172 (i9o5); Cook's Adm'r v. Hendricks, 4 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 5oo (1827);
Webster v. Trust Co., 145 N. Y. 275, 39 N. E. 964 (i895); Van Tassel v. Burger, rig
N. Y. App. Div. 5o9, 104 N. Y. Supp. 273 (1907). The language of the court in
Teneick v. Flagg, 29 N. J. L. 25 (i86o) is contra, although the case is distinguishable
on the facts.
13 P. 59.
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be too late to affect C.'s previously acquired title and B. will lose.
If C. is not a bona fide purchaser we may expect that the court,
instead of saying that C. has the legal title but subject to an equity
in favor of B. which B. may protect in a court of chancery, will say
that the escrow deed relates to the first delivery and so gives B. the
older legal title and that C. gets no legal title at all. An examination
of the cases in which the question has been raised will show that so
far as the actual decisions go there is almost complete unanimity in
the results reached. The following are the more important characteristic cases that raise this question.
A. and B. make a contract for the sale of land and A. delivers his
escrow to X. for B. A. then marries C. B. then performs and the
deed is delivered. It will relate to the first delivery so that C., the
wife, will have no dower interest in the land, and the deed will not
be open to the objection that it does not pass a clear title.14
Again, where A., after the delivery of the deed in escrow to X.,
'sells the same land to C., who gives therefor a valuable consideration but knows of the deed delivered in escrow to X., B., the grantee in the escrow deed, will, on performing the conditions of the
escrow and getting the deed, obtain thereby a title that is at law
superior to that which C. obtained from A. 5
An attaching creditor is not, in most jurisdictions, treated as a purchaser for value; consequently as against him also the title of B., the
grantee, will "relate" to the first delivery and defeat the attachment. 6
"

Vorhes v. Kitch, 8 Phila. (Pa.) 554 (1871).

15Leiter v. Pike, 127 I1. 287, 2o N. E. 23 (i889); Tharaldson v. Everts, 87 Minn.
x68, 91 N. W. 467 (1902), semble; Lewis v. Prather, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 749, 21 S. W. 538
(1893). Three California cases are worth noting in regard to the nature of the right
that the grantee in the escrow deed obtains as against a purchaser for value with
notice who gets his title between the first and second escrow deliveries. In Cannon
v. Handley, 72 Cal. 133 , 13 Pac. 315 (1887), the court held that the legal title went
to C., the vialdfide purchaser, but that B., the grantee in the escrow deed, was entitled
to a conveyance of the title. In Conneau v. Geis, 73 Cal. 176, 14 Pac. 580 (1887), on
the same state of facts, where the action was for the possession of the land, the court
.held that B. was entitled to possession as against C. In McDonald v. Huff, 77 Cal.
279, ig Pac. 499 (i888), on the same state of facts the court again held that B. was
entitled to possession against C., and further said that as against B., C. "gets no
title." See also Wittenbrock v. Cass, zio Cal. i (i895).
16Dettmer v. Behrens, io6 Ia. 585, 76 N. W. 853 (1898); Whitfield v. Harris, 48
Miss. 710 (1870); Hall v. Harris, 5 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 303 (848).
Walcott v. Johns,
7 Colo. App. 36o, 44 Pac. 675 (I896), is sometimes cited as contra. In that case A.,
the vendor, was endeavoring to compel B. to accept a title against which there ex-
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Price v. Pittsburg R. Co.17 presents a different illustration of

the same tendency. In that case the land covered by the escrow was occupied by tenants. The vendees paid interest on the
purchase price from the date of the delivery to X., the holder
of the escrow. After performance and delivery of the deed
the title was held to relate to the first delivery, and the vendees
were allowed to maintain against the tenants an action of assumpsit for use and occupation from the date of the first delivery
of the escrow.
Over against these cases is to be set the case where C. occupies
the position of a bon.fide purchaser. Thus under the recording law
18
of Oregon an attaching creditor is treated as a purchaser for value.
A. and B. had made a contract for the sale of the land and A. had
deposited the deed in escrow with X. B. had made part payment.
C., a creditor of A., then attached. It was held that any further
payments to X. for A. made by B. after notice of C.'s attachment
were ineffectual as against C., who by his attachment obtained all
the interest that A. still retained in the premises, namely, the bare
legal title and an equitable right to hold that title for the unpaid
balance of the purchase price.' 9
Thus far in the cases that have been examined B.'s equity has
been the older, and the question has been whether the later transaction with C. did or did not cut it off or, to put it correspondingly in
the formula that is usually employed, whether B.'s deed did not
or did relate. This application of the doctrine of relation in escrow
in exact analogy to the principles of equity appears, however, in
other ways. Thus in one case A. derived title from C. under a voidable tax deed duly recorded. A. had brought an action to quiet title
against C. and judgment had been rendered in A.'s favor. A. later
contracted to sell and B. to buy the land, and A. executed a deed
.and deposited it in escrow with X. for B. C. then filed a motion
to reopen the proceedings in the action to quiet title and to set aside
isted C.'s attachment lien, acquired with notice of the relation between A. and B.
The court held that B. could not be compelled to accept a doubtful title. In Jackson v. Rowland, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 666 (1831), the attaching creditor prevailed over
the grantee in escrow. It is not clear in that case, however, that at the time of C.'s
attachment there was any definite contract with respect to the sale of the land.
17 3 Ill. 13 (1864).
18Oregon, Hill's Ann. Laws, sec. i5o.
19May v. Emerson, 52 Or. 262, 96 Pac. 454, io65 (i9o8).
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the judgment in A.'s favor. B. paid the purchase price and received
the deed, and was then made a party to the proceedings. It was
held that B. had constructive notice by the filing of C.'s motion, and
that consequently as against C. his deed would not relate, if the
title should ultimately be found to be in C.20 This case is a very
pretty illustration in legal language of the equitable principle that
the owner of the junior equity who gets his equity in good faith
and who then starts to get in the legal title will take the legal title
subject to the older equity provided2 he has notice of the older equity
before paying the purchase price. 1
An unconscious application of another principle of equity to the
doctrine of relation is seen in Frost v. Beekman.2 A., in pursuance
of a contract with B., delivered to X. a conveyance of the land to
be delivered to B. when he should give X. a duly executed mortgage of the land in favor of A. B. made a deed of the land to C. B.
then executed the mortgage to A., had it recorded, delivered it to
X. and received from X. the conveyance executed by A. Both A.
and C. acted without actual notice. It was held that as between
A. and C. the conveyance from A. to B. would not relate, because
so to hold would make the mortgage to A. subsequent to the conveyance to C.; and as the escrow is allowed to relate only "to do
justice" it would not be allowed so to do in this case; with the consequence that C. took subject to A."s mortgage. The court added
that as between A. and B. the escrow would relate. Had there been
no conveyance in escrow here but merely an agreement to convey,
and had B. then deeded to C., then mortgaged to A. and contemporaneously taken a deed from A., it seems clear that a court of
equity in settling the rights of the parties would have reached the
same result that was reached here in legal form.2
Another illustration of the underlying principles of the doctrine
of relation is the following case. A. contracted with B. and C.
for the sale of land, and in pursuance of the contract left with X.
his escrow executed in favor of B. and C. B. died before the performance of the contract. It was held that upon the performance
20 Baker v. Snavely, 84 Kan. 179, 114 Pac. 370 (19i).
21 Ames, Cases on Trusts, 2 ed., 287.

2

Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 288 (1814), reversed on other grounds, i8 Johns. (N. Y.)

s44 (182o).
2 Cf. Eyre v. Burmester, xo H. of L. 9o (1862); Ames, Cases on Trusts, 2 ed., 3o6.
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of the contract by C. and the delivery of the deed by X. B.'s heir
and C. took the legal title as tenants in common.24
As previously pointed out the regular rule is, soundly enough,
that inter partes the title in an escrow deed passes at the second
delivery. Where, however, even inter partes the analogy to doctrines of equity would require the court to hold that the deed relates, it has not hesitated so to do. Take, for example, the rule of
equity that where the vendee pays interest on the purchase price
from the time of the making of the contract up to performance,
he is entitled to the rents and profits of the land in the absence of
an express contract giving them to the vendor.4 A. and B. made a
contract for the conveyance of a tract, the deed was deposited in
escrow with X., A. collected the rents until the second delivery by
X. to B., the latter having also paid interest on the purchase price.
It was held that on the delivery of the deed the title related to the
first delivery and B. was allowed to maintain an action against
A. for breach of the covenant of warranty.26
Before leaving this branch of the subject, there is one slightly
different class of case that should be noticed. Thus far we have
dealt with cases where the agreement between A. and B. consisted
of a mutually enforceable contract, in pursuance of which the deed
was delivered in escrow. Is there any difference in the application
of the doctrine of relation if A. gives B. a binding option on the
land? So far as the rights of the parties in a court of equity are
concerned, it has been said in England 27 that B. will be unable to
enforce this option as against a purchaser from A. of the legal title,
this case being regarded as coming within the principle laid down
in Haywood v. Brunswick Building Society 28 that a court of equity
will not enforce an affirmative obligation relating to the land against
another than the original contractor. In this country, however,
there are several decisions and dicta to the effect that such an option is enforceable against a person who takes under A. with notice
or without paying consideration.29 In the working out of these same
Lindley v. Groff, 37 Minn. 338, 34-N. W. 26 (1887).
29 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, 2 ed., 708.
2 Scott v. Stone, 72 Kan. 545. 84 Pac. 117 (i9o6). Compare ante, p. 567.
27 London & Southwestern Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562, 583 (1882).
28 8 Q. B. D. 403 (i88x).
29 Ross v. Parks, 93 Ala. 153, 8 So. 368 (i8go); Black v. Maddox, io4 Ga. 157,
30 S. E. 723 (1898); Page v. Martin, 46 N. J. Eq. 585, 20 At. 46 (i8go); Cummins
24
2
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equitable principles in the escrow cases no distinction is made between the mutually enforceable contract and the option. In fact
it is frequently difficult to discover whether the agreement between
the parties, in pursuance of which the delivery in escrow was
made, was a mutual contract or an option. There are, however, a
few cases where it seems clear that there was only an option. Thus
where in pursuance of an option contract A. deposited in escrow
with X. a deed in favor of B. and died devising the land to C., B.
on a subsequent compliance with the terms of the option was held
to have obtained by A.'s deed a legal title good "by relation"
against the devisee; 31 in another similar case such a deed was held
binding against A.'s heir,3 and in another against a purchaser
2
3

with notice.

It seems dear then that in these cases of escrows the courts
have, with one or two possible exceptions, uniformly in varying
sets of circumstances worked out what they have treated as the
legal rights of the parties in precisely the same way that a court of
chancery would have worked them out as equitable rights.
II.
In the class of cases just considered, the two salient facts have
been these: first, that A., the grantor, did not intend by the execution and delivery of the deed to the holder in escrow thereby to pass
to B., the grantee, any interest in the land; whether the deed should
ever become operative remained an uncertainty depending upon
whether or not B. performed his part of the contract: second, that
B. had throughout an equitable interest in the land. The class of
case now to be considered differs in both regards from the preceding
group. Suppose that A. executes in favor of B. a deed of Blackacre
and gives it to X. and says, "This is for B., give it to him at my
death." What rights arise out of this transaction?
At the outset a rather difficult question of fact sometimes presents itself. Does A.. mean to keep control over his deed so that
v. Beavers,

1o3

Va.

230,

48 S. E. 89I (19o4); Marthinson

v.

King, x~o Fed. 48

(r9o6).

30 Chadwick v. Tatem, 9 Mont. 354, 23 Pac. 729 (189o).
Si Gammon v. Bunnell, 22 Utah 42i, 64 Pac. 958 (Igoo).
" Baum's Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 58, 4 Atl. 461 (i886). See also Whitmer v.Schenk,
ii Idaho 702, 83 Pac. 775 (19o6).
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he still has the right to take it back, with the result that the situation really is that X. is to deliver the deed to B. only if A. does not
tell him to do something else with it, i. e., is X. really holding it simply as A.'s depositary; or has A. definitely parted with all control
over it, does he regard the transaction as finished so that the
If
matter of B.'s getting the land is only a question of time? 13
the former view be taken of the facts the whole question falls. The
decided preponderance, both of decisions and dicta, is that unless A.
relinquishes all control over the instrument at the time of the delivery to X. it differs in no wise from a will, because not until the
moment of A.'s death can it be regarded as definitely intended to
be operative; and being in substance a will, it must fail of effect
because it does not satisfy the statutory requirements of a will.
Assuming that A. reserves no such control over the deed as to
make it substantially a testamentary instrument, and so bad for
the reasons just considered, what are the rights that arise from the
delivery to X. of the deed for B.? There seem to be two pretty
clearly defined theories on which the courts have proceeded, although it must also be pointed out that in some cases the courts
seem to have shifted from one view to the other, apparently without any clear appreciation of the fact that they were so changing
their position.
In the larger number of states where this question has arisen
for adjudication the rule has been laid down that the delivery by
A. to X. vests immediately the title to the land in B." In some states
3 For cases where the decision has turned on this question of fact cf. Jones v. Loveless, 99 Ind. 317 (1884), with Owen v. Williams, 114 Ind. 179, i5 N. E. 678 (1887);
Hale v. Joslin, 134 Mass. 310 (1883), with Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N. D. 475,

75 N. W. 797 (898);

and the majority and minority views in Hathaway v. Payne,

34 N. Y. 92 (i865).
34 Doe v. Bennett, 8 C. & P. 124 (1837); Wellborn v. Weaver, 17 Ga. 267 (i855);

Stinson v. Anderson, 96 Ill. 373 (1880); Jones v. Loveless, supra; Careyv. Dennis, 13
Md. i (1858); Hale v. Joslin, supra; Cook v. Brown, 34 N. H. 460 (1857), overruling
Shed v. Shed, 3 N. H. 432 (1826); Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644 (1872).

In some

few jurisdictions it has been held that the fact that the grantor reserved the power to
revoke the deed will not make it bad if in fact he dies without having exercised the right
of revocation. Belden v. Carter, 4 Day (Conn.) 66 (i8o9); Woodward v. Camp, 22
Conn. 457 (1853) (but see Griley v. Atkins, 78 Conn. 380, 62 At. 337 (19o));
Ruggles v. Lawson, i3 Johns. (N. Y.) 285 (186); Morse v. Slason, 13 Vt. 296 (1841).
a Doe v. Bennett, 8 C. & P. 124 (1837); Schurz v. Schurz, 153 Ia. 187, 128 N. W.
944 (igio); Thatcher v. St. Andrews, 37 Mich. 264 (1877); Wicklund v. Lindquist,
102 Minn. 321, 113 N. W. 631 (1907) senble; Brown v. Westerfield, 47 Neb. 399,
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this rule is accompanied by the qualification that B.'s interest is
subject to a life estate in favor of A.36 The rule as thus laid down
undoubtedly achieves just the result that the grantor had in mind.
By his delivery to X. he intends to settle the matter once for all,
and then and there to vest in B. a definite, indestructible, real
right. By his direction to the depositary to retain the deed in his
own possession until the death of the grantor, he dearly has in mind
the creation of a situation such that he shall not be disturbed in the
possession of the property during his life. On just what theory
the courts proceed in their doctrine that A. has a life estate is not
dear. There is ordinarily nothing on the face of the instrument sufficient to create such an estate.37 The result may perhaps be reached
upon the theory of a resulting use which would give A. a legal life
estate; or upon the theory of a trust of some sort which would
give him an equitable estate, although the relation of such to the
Statute of Frauds is nowhere, so far as the writer is aware, discussed in these cases; or, which would seem perfectly sound, the
courts may mean simply that since the deed is in the possession of X.
and will not be delivered to B. until A.'s death, there is no one
who can disturb A. in the possession of the land and that consequently he has what is substantially as good as a life estate; perhaps with the further implication that should B., prior to A.'s
death, obtain possession of the deed by fraud or otherwise, a court
of equity at least would protect A. in the enjoyment of the
premises.
The theory above outlined is simple and, if the statements of the
court as to the existence of a life estate in the grantor be taken in
the sense last suggested, is not inconsistent with other branches of
the law of real property. In a number of jurisdictions, however,
the courts have used language which, taken at its face value, would
66 N. W. 439 (1896); Schlicher v. Keeler, 6I N. J. Eq. 394, 48 Ad. 393 (19o),

semble.
2

36 Bury v. Young, 98 Cal. 446, 33 Pac. 338 (1893); Wheelwright v. Wheelwright,
Mass. 447 (1807); Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N. D. 475, 75 N. W. 797 (898);

Maxwell v. Harper, 5i Wash. 35', 98 Pac. 756 (igog).

See infra, note 39.

37 In some cases the language of the deed is held to amount to an express reservation
of a life estate in the grantor. Vest v. Wright, "iS Ga. 277, 41 S. E. 602 (1902);
Douglas v. Vest, 140 Ill. 455, 31 N. E. 403 (1892); Hunt v. Hunt, i9 Ky. 39, 82
S. W. 998 (19o4); Martin v. Flaharty, 13 Mont. 96, 32 Pac. 287 (1893); Ball v.
Foreman, 37 Oh. St. 132

(188I).
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seem to indicate that in the class of case now under consideration
they thought the rule to be that the title passes from A. to B.
only on the delivery of the deed by X. to B., 'r perhaps at the
moment of A.'s death, with the corollary that when necessary for
the purposes of justice the title will relate to the time of the delivery from A. to X. 38 This whole doctrine is undoubtedly derived
from the class of true escrows already considered in the first part
of this article; indeed the courts sometimes refer to the present
situation as being a delivery in escrow. The fundamental differences, however, between the two kinds of cases are obvious. As
already pointed out, the reason why in the true escrows A. cannot
change his intent after the delivery of the deed to X., or to put it
more accurately, why his change of intent is immaterial, and the
reason why the deed relates under certain circumstances is that
B. throughout has in the land an equitable interest that is being
protected in these legal forms. This foundation is here wholly
lacking; B. is, ex hypothesi, a donee; he has neither paid any consideration nor performed any act that would raise an equity in his
favor. On the theory now under consideration that no title passes
to B. until A.'s death, it is hard to perceive any reason why A.
should not be permitted to change his mind and revoke his deed
at any time prior to his death. Not only does B. on this theory
not have any real rights, but he has not even a contract right.
And if A. may change his mind at any time prior to his death, the
document would seem in substance to be a testamentary instrument and bad if it fails to satisfy the requirements necessary to a
will. The truth of the matter seems to be either that the courts
use this phraseology loosely and without meaning exactly what they
say (as will be pointed out in the next paragraph), or else we have
here a possible new doctrine in the law of conveyances by deed
which will be considered more at length later on.
Admitting that there seems to exist in this branch of the subject
this conflict in the doctrines held by the different courts, the more
important question is as to how real this apparent conflict is. If
we direct our attention not to the language of the courts but to the
result that they reach, the differences between these two groups
of decisions largely disappear. There is a peculiar justification for
38 Kirkwood v. Smith, 212 III. 395, 72 N. E. 427 (1904); Stephens v. Rinehart,
Pa. St. 434 (1872); McCaUa v. Bane, 45 Fed. 828 (1891). See infra, note 39.
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disregarding the exact language of the courts in these cases, because
of the fact already alluded to that in some instances in the same
jurisdiction the court has at one time apparently based its decision
upon the ground that the title passes to the grantee at the moment
of delivery by the grantor to the depositary, and at another time
upon the ground that it passes as of the date of the second delivery,
but relates.3 9 Looking then only to the facts of these cases it will
be seen that in almost nine-tenths of them the contest is between
B. the grantee of the deed and the heirs of the grantor. In such a
case the only real question is whether B. has the title. How or
when he got it is of minor importance. Under such circumstances
the statement that the title passes only at the second delivery, or
the further statement that when it passes it relates to the first delivery, need not be taken with literal exactness.
Conceding, however, that in most of the cases it is unnecessary
to
do more than decide that B. has at some time acquired from A. a
title that is good against A.'s heir, if the contest arises between the
grantee under the deed and some person who claims a right derived
from A. between the first and the second delivery the need for an exact delimitation of the rights of the parties then becomes imperative.
If the court goes on the theory that B. gets title from the first delivery so that the utmost that A. has after the delivery of the deed to
X. is a legal life estate, then any person claiming under A., whether
as purchaser, creditor, or donee, would acquire no property right
that could be asserted against B. after A.'s death. The possibility
of the common-law rights of the person claiming under A. being
39 Thus in Connecticut, in Woodward v. Camp, 22 Conn. 457 (1853),the court seems

to follow the theory that the title passes at the second delivery and relates; in Grilley
v. Atkins, 78 Conn. 380, 62 At. 337 (x9o5), it seems to say that the title passes at the
first delivery subject to a life estate in the grantor; so in Indiana in Owen v. Williams,
114 Ind. 179, 15 N. E. 678 (1887),and Goodpaster v. Leathers, 123 Ind. 121, 23 N. E.

iogo(z889), on the one hand, and Stout r. Rayl, 146 Ind. 379, 45 N. E. Si5 (i896),
on the other, respectively; in Missouri, in Williams v. Latham, 113 Mo. 165, 20
S. W. 99 (1892), and Terry v. Glover, 235 Mo. 544, 139 S. W. 337 (1911), respectively; so in New York in Tooley v.Dibble, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 641 (1842), and Nottbeck v.
Wilks, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 315 (1857), on the one hand, and Brown v.Austen, 35 Barb.
(N. Y). 341 (1861), on the other, respectively; in Rosseau v. Bleau, 131 N. Y. 177, 30
N. E. 52 (1892), and Stonehill v. Hastings, 202 N. Y. 115, 94 N. E. io68 (1911), the

court seems to follow the earlier cases; so in Ohio in Crooks v. Crooks, 34 Oh. St. 61o
(1878), and Ball v.Foreman, 37 Oh. St. 132 (r88i), respectively. See also the language
of the court in Wheelwright v.Wheelwright, 2 Mass. 446 (18o7).
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enlarged by virtue of the recording acts need not at present be
considered. In the cases that proceed upon this theory as to the
effect of the original delivery the results reached are in accord with
this reasoning. In Brown v. Austen 40 the contest was between
judgment creditors of A. the grantor, their rights accruing after the
first delivery and B. the gratuitous grantee, to whom the second
delivery had been made after A.'s death. The judgment was for
B. The court examined the question carefully and stated that
only if the deed took effect from the first delivery would the grantee
4
prevail as against the attaching creditors. In Wittenbrock v. Cass
B. won as against one who, after the delivery by A. to X. of the deed
in B.'s favor and before the delivery of the deed to B. by X., purchased the same lands from A. with knowledge of the deed to B.
The court based its decision on the earlier case of Bury v. Young,2
in which case B. won as against a devisee of A. The two cases
are, however, distinguishable in that in the later case B. paid a
consideration.

43

If now we take the theory that a title passes to B. only by the
second delivery, it must be dear that except in so far as B. is
protected by the doctrine of relation he will lose as against anyone
who in the interval between the first and the second delivery
acquires from A. any interest, legal or equitable, in the same piece
of land. If the interest acquired by the third person is legal, B.
will dearly lose as having the later legal title. If the interest acquired by the third person is equitable, B. will also lose, for although
in that case he would acquire the legal title he would get it as a
donee, hence subject to previous equities. How far then in this
group of cases is B. helped out by the doctrine of relation?
In Rathmell v. Shirey" the contest was between creditors of
the deceased grantor and B. the gratuitous grantee. The grantor
had remained in possession of the land, the creditors had no notice,
41 rio Cal. x, 42 Pac. 300 (1895).
Supra, p. 57998 Cal. 446, 33 Pac. 338 (1893).
43 In Blair v. St. Louis R. Co., 24 Fed. 539 (1885), the court held that B. after the
delivery to him by X. of A.'s deed could not defeat a right of way granted in fee by
A. to C. between the first and the second delivery. The court, however, based its decision upon the ground that B. was barred by the Statute of Limitations, and also
referred to the fact that A. remained in possession and that the deed to B. was not at
the time recorded.
44 6o Oh. St. 187 (1899), 53 N. E. io98.
40
2
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actual or constructive, of the deed to B. and extended credit upon
the faith of A.'s apparent ownership.. The court, while not finding
any fraud, said that the doctrine of relation applied only to do justice, that it would not do justice to apply it here, and gave judgment
in favor of the creditors." It should be noticed that in Ohio lien
creditors are within the protection of the recording act, and simple
creditors of a deceased debtor are by virtue of the lien which arises
at his death also brought within the act; 46 in other words, that the
creditors here were in the position of purchasers for value without
notice. In this case, therefore, even had the court proceeded upon
the theory that the title passed to B. at the first delivery, the result would have been the same.
In Smiley v. Smiley 47 a wife of A., whom he had married after
his delivery to X. of the deed to B., claimed dower in the land so
conveyed. Judgment was for B., his title being said to relate to the
first delivery. The court said that while marriage might be a
valuable consideration, the determining element in this case was
the fact that the woman married with knowledge of the conveyance to B. In Ladd v. Ladd, 8 where the wife's right to dower also
depended upon the question whether A. died seised of the land,
the court held that the deed would not relate and that the wife
was entitled. This case, however, may rest upon the ground that
X. was throughout the depositary for A. and not for B.
In Stone v. Duvall 49 B., the grantee, died after delivery to X.
but during the life of A. A. thereupon filed a bill to have the deed
canceled. The court held that this could not be done; that although the deed did not operate to give B. any immediate rights
or interest in the premises, nevertheless it was out of A.'s power to
affect it, and on his death the delivery to B.'s heir would operate
by relation to vest the title in the said heir. The court referred to
the fact that the deed purported to be for a consideration.
These cases are too few to justify any very general conclusions.
These suggestions may, however, be made: (i) No decision, with
the possible exception of Ladd v. Ladd, that purports to stand on
this doctrine of relation reaches a result different from that which
Accord, Owen v. Williams, 114 mId. 179; i5 N. E. 678 (1888), semble.
Straman v. Rechtine, 58 Oh. St. 443, 51 N. E. 44 (1898).
47 114 Ind. 258, 16 N. E. 585 (1888).
4' 77 II 475 (I875).
48 14 Vt. 185 (1842).
4

'6
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would have been reached had it proceeded on the more generally
accepted and sounder view that title passes by the first delivery;
(2) Assuming the doctrine of relation to be applicable to these
cases, the application of the doctrine is harmonious with the application of it in the cases of the true escrows: i. e., there is no relation
of the title where the situation is such that if B., instead of being the
grantee under an escrow, were the holder of an equitable interest
in the land, his equity would be cut off by the transactions had between his grantor and the third person contesting B.'s right, and
where the situation is such that an equity would not be cut off, the
doctrine of relation is applied.
Ill.
The characteristic features of the two groups of cases that have
been thus far considered have been these: In the first group, the
delivery of the escrow by the grantor A. to the depositary X. is not
intended by the grantor to pass thereby to the grantee B. any interest in the property, and whether any title ever shall pass depends
upon the future coDduct of the grantee; in addition, however, to
this delivery in escrow, there is some other transaction between A.
and B. sufficient per se to create in B. an interest in the land that a
court of equity would protect. In the second group the state of
affairs is just the opposite; there is no transaction between A. and
B. sufficient to give an equitable estate in the land, but on the
other hand when A. delivers the deed to the depositary his intent
that it shall definitely operate in B.'s favor is unqualified; it may
be his intent that the operation of it, so far as the giving of a possessory interest is concerned, shall be for a time postponed, but that
is the only qualification. There remains for consideration a group
of cases, not very numerous, in which appears neither of the affmative factors above mentioned, i. e., where there is no transaction
between A. and B. sufficient to create in B. an equitable interest in
the land, and where on the other hand it is not dear that A. by his
delivery to X. of the deed in B.'s favor intends to part with all
control over the deed and to vest at once in B. an unconditional
interest in the land postponed only with respect to the possessory
rights until A.'s death.
Thus, suppose that there being no contractual relation of any
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sort between A. and B., A. executes a deed in favor of B. and
delivers it to X. to be delivered by him to B. if B. does some act,
as paying a certain sum. It has been held in such a case that the
50
On the other
title passes to B. only upon the doing of the act.
the deed; 51
withdraw
may
A.
thereto
prior
time
hand, at any
later make
cannot
B.
ended,
or if, A. being a trustee, the trust is
52
the deed effective by complying with its terms; or, if A. dies
before performance by B., the deed cannot later be made operative.P The court said, in this latter case, that the deed under
these circumstances was nothing more than an offer, necessarily
terminating on A.'s death. A fortiori is this result inevitable
where, from the very nature of the offer upon which the deed is
delivered in escrow, it cannot be performed during A.'s life, as
where A. executes a deed to B., his son, and gives it to X. to deliver
to B. if the latter shall after A.'s death make provision for certain
specified persons.1 The court here, from the fact that the conditions by their own terms could not be performed, and the instrument thereby become effective until after the grantor's death,
said that the instrument was for this reason necessarily testamentary in character.55 Another case in which the court definitely
5
The Wisconsin
examined this question is Campbell v. Thomas
Statute of Frauds makes a parol contract for the sale of land void.
Under such a contract with B., A. executed a deed in B.'s favor
and gave it to X. to be delivered when B. paid the stipulated price.
X., on A.'s instructions, refused to deliver the deed to B., and the
court held categorically that it was essential to create rights
under an escrow that there should be a valid contractual relation
between the parties.
On the other hand, there are not lacking cases in which, on somewhat similar states of fact, the c6urts have held that if the contingency occurred or the requirement was satisfied by B. even after
50 Sparrow v. Smith, 5 Conn.

113 (1823).

51 Davis v. Brigham, 56 Or. 41, 107 Pac. 96i (igio).
Cf. Anderson v. Realty Co.,
52 Anderson v. Messenger, 158 Fed. 250 (1907).

29

Oh.

Cir. Ct. 267 (i9o6).

Or. 404, 96 Pac. 536 (19o8).
N. NV. 426 (i886).
5' This appears to be the definitely established rule in Michigan. Culy v. Upham,
E35 Mich. 131, 97 N. W. 405 (19o3); Felt v. Felt, i5 Mich. 237, 118 N. W. 953
' 42 Wis. 437 (1877).
(19o8).
"

De Bow v. Wollenberg,

52

54 Taft v. Taft, 59 Mich. i85, 26
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the death of A., the title would thereupon pass to B. Thus in
Nolan v. Otney 67 A. executed a deed of land in favor of B. and gave
it to X. It was originally intended that his delivery should be absolute, but in fact A. kept control of the deed, although it was in
X.'s custody. A day or two before A. died he told X. to deliver the
deed to B. if B. should pay a sum of money and' execute a note.
After A.'s death B. fulfilled these requirements and X. delivered
him the deed. In an action between A.'s widow and B. (apparently
to determine the title to the land) it was held that B. had the legal
title. The court, after animadverting upon the fact that ordinarily
the acts to be done by the grantee are contemplated as being performed in the life of the grantor, and pointing out that these requirements might have been complied with in the life of the grantor,
said that this fact was of no importance, that there was no more
difficulty in applying the doctrine of relation to this class of case
than to any other case of delivery in escrow; and that upon the
performance by B. of the conditions imposed by A. the title passed
to the former as of the date of the original delivery of the instrument." The same principle has been applied in one or two cases
where there was no act to be performed by B. which could in any
wise be regarded as in the nature of a consideration for the transfer
of the title. In Hunter v. Hunter 59 A. delivered to X. a deed in
favor of B. to be delivered to him if he reached the age of twentyfive. It was held that the death of A. before B. reached twenty-five
would not prevent the title passing to him upon the happening of
that event, the court saying that there was by the first delivery "a
quasi-creation of an estate subject to be defeated by the failure to
perform the stipulated condition." 60
These latter cases seem hard to sustain on any generally accepted
principles of law. The difference between these and the other deeds
57 75 Kan. 3i, 89 Pac. 6go (1907).
58 Accord, as to a bond, Graham v. Graham, i Ves. Jr. 272 (r791). In Wittenbrock
v. Cass, iio Cal. 1, 42 Pac. 300 (1895), and Hutton v. Cramer, io Ariz. io, 85 Pac.
483 (igo6), the courts used language to the same effect although it was not necessary
to the decisions.
59 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 25 (1853).
60 See also Cook v. Niehaus, 8 Weekly L. Bull. (Ohio) 259 (1882).
In Prewitt v.
Ashford, 9o Ala. 294, 7 So. 831 (i8go), where the grantee was apparently a donee, the
court treated the conveyance as being an escrow and creating rights by relation from
the time of the first delivery.
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made in contemplation of death is marked. In them A. intends
unqualifiedly that the title shall go to B. and regards the delivery
of the deed to X. as settling matters definitely. Here the very fact
that there is the further condition of something being done by B.
or of some contingency's occurring, shQws that the delivery by A.
to X. is not intended by the grantor to be final any more than it is
in the case of a true escrow. Of course, if B. performs prior to A.'s
death there is no difficulty in sustaining the deed, even though the
second delivery is after A.'s death, because the performance by
B. would raise an equity in his favor. Where this is not the situation, B. as a volunteer has no equity, nor, as just said, has A. by the
delivery to X. intended to vest a title in B. postponing only the
possession. If such is the case the complete title to the property
must still be in A. and at his death it must go to his heir. Once in
A.'s heir, how can A.'s uncompleted deed operate to take the title
from him? Merely to say that there is a rule of law that A.'s deed
relates is not particularly satisfactory, especially when in the other
cases of relation it is possible to find a recognized principle in analogy
to which the doctrine of relation is applied.
There is the explanation suggested in Hunter v. Hunter,6 that the
deed operates from the first delivery to vest a legal title in B. subject to a condition subsequent. This is open to several objections:
it would have to be further modified to embrace the conception of
the postponing of possession; it is based upon a construction of the
facts that is unjustified, for the very fact that the contingency is
uncertain or that B. is to do something further is strong evidence
that no more here than in the case of the true escrow is the delivery
to the depositary intended to pass at once an estate to the grantee
(it is true that the grantor intends by this delivery to give the
grantee the right to get an estate, but this will be considered presently); finally, this theory is open to the fundamental objection
that it attempts by parol, not to show when the deed is to be delivered, for it is generally accepted that this is not within the Statute
of Frauds,6 2 but to modify the face of the deed and read into\it a
condition subsequent that will operate to affect the title to realty.
"' Supra, p. 584.
62 Cannon v. Handley, 72 Cal. 133, 13 Pac. 315 (1887); Dikeman v. Arnold,
71 Mich. 656,40 N. W. 42 (1888); Stanton v. Miller, 58 N. Y. 192 (1874); Gaston v.
Portland, x6 Or. 255, 19 Pac. 127 (i888); Nichols v. Oppermann, 6 Wash. 618, 34 Pac.
162 (1893).
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The following suggestion may be made with respect to these
cases, although no decision resting upon this ground has been discovered. The cases like Davis v. Brigham " are sound enough.
They are cases of purely business dealings where the grantor
throughout intends to do nothing more, as one of the cases itself
says, than to make an offer which he can withdraw at any-time
prior to acceptance by the grantee. In the cases like Nolan v.
Otney,6 4 on the other hand, this is not the case. While it is true, as
said before, that the grantor does not intend by the first delivery to
give B. a title, since it is only if B. performs the further requirement
that he is to get the deed, it is also true that A. intends to give, and
probably considers that by so depositing the deed with X. he has
given, B. an irrevocable right to earn the title by doing the required act or to have it come to him if the stipulated contingency
happens. It may be, then, that these few cases and the' language
used by some of the courts in the cases considered in the preceding
section indicate a tendency toward a rule that when the deed, perfect
on its face and requiring no further act on the part of the grantor,
is delivered by him to a depositary with the intent stated above,
this is in itself a sufficient part performance by A. of the transfer of
the title so that upon these facts alone an indefeasible right is
created in B. to be allowed to perform within a reasonable time or
to await the coming of the specified contingency, with the result
that when the performance is made or the event does happen the
title vests, and may be said to "relate." It is well settled that
equity will, under certain circumstances, compel a donor to complete an inchoate gift in cases where at law no rights would arise.65
It may be that here is another kind of uncompleted transaction
where law is going one step beyond equity. It may be that the
courts in these cases consider the gift by A., if the act required of
B. be regarded as the occasion simply of the vesting of the title,
or the offer by A., if the act of B. be regarded as the consideration
for the transfer of the title, as having advanced to such a stage
(since no further act need be required of A. and the document purporting to convey the title is out of his physical control) as to give
' Supra, p. 583.
6 Supra, p. 584. This case, however, and Taft v. Taft, supra, p. 583, are directly
contra.
6 The cases are collected in 36 Cyc. 681 et seq.
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B. something sufficiently like an equitable interest to put him in at
least as good a position as the beneficiary in a voluntary declaration of trust. Of course it is obvious that B. is not the beneficiary
under a declared trust, nor is he in such a position that for any other
reason he could go into equity and compel a transfer of the title.
'At the same time, there would be nothing inherently unreasonable
or unsound if a law court should declare that under facts such as
we have been considering B. was entitled to be protected. That the
step should be declared to be merely a new application of wellrecognized principles, or that it should be taken under the kindly
over of a fiction, would surprise no one who is familiar with the
way in which law develops.

Harry A. Bigelow.
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